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THE NEED FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORM
IN OHIO'S DEFINITION OF INJURY:
Szymanski v. Halle's Department Store
I. INTRODUCTION
A RECENT OHIO DECISION CONCERNING COMPENSABILITY of an injury
was a most disappointing one for those interested in Ohio workers'
compensation reform. In Szymanski v. Halle's Department Store,1 the
Ohio Supreme Court held that "[a] heart condition brought on by emo-
tional stress without contemporaneous physical trauma or injury
resulting from a verbal attack by fellow employees is not compensable
under [Ohio Revised Code] section 4123.01(C)."' The court found that
physical disabilities occasioned solely by emotional stress received in
the course of, and arising out of, the employee's employment does not
constitute an "injury" under Ohio workers' compensation law.' Thus, the
plaintiff was denied a remedy even though workers' compensation is a
statutory scheme designed to compensate workers injured in the course
of their employment.4 Article II, section 35 of the Ohio Constitution pro-
vides: "For the purpose of providing compensation to workmen and
their dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease, occasioned
in the course of such workmen's employment, laws may be passed .... "'
In 1959 the General Assembly adopted its current definition of
"injury." At that time, an amendment was made to Ohio Revised Code
section 4123.01(C) to provide that: "'Injury' includes any injury, whether
caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and
63 Ohio St. 2d 195, 407 N.E.2d 502 (1980).
Id. at 195, 407 N.E.2d at 505.
' Throughout this Note, "workmen's compensation" and "workers' compensa-
tion" will be used interchangeably. S. 545, 111th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1976),
amended the workmen's compensation statutes and substituted the word
"workers" for "workmen's." 1976 Ohio Laws 1075. This change became effective
on January 1, 1977; therefore, all prior judicial opinions refer to "workmen's com-
pensation."
58 0. JUR. 2d Workers' Compensation § 53 (1963). Workers' compensation is
a statutory plan insuring a faster, more certain scheme of reimbursement for
employees whose injuries arise out of and are causally related to their work.
Prior to such legislative action, employees had difficulty succeeding in negligence
actions. Employers effectively used the defenses of assumption of the risk, fellow-
servant immunity and contributory negligence, to bar recovery by the employee.
The modern no-fault concept of workers' compensation places the burden on the
employee to prove only that he was employed and that an accident occurred in
the course of, and arose out of, the employment. Reimbursement, although more
certain and faster than in a negligence action, is fixed by statute at a percentage
of wages lost during a limited period.
' OHIO CONST. art. II, § 35.
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result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured
employee's employment."' Also, the legislature added, for the first time,
a liberal construction statute to chapter 4123: "Sections 4123.01 to
4123.94, inclusive, of the Revised Code shall be liberally construed in
favor of employees and the dependents of deceased employees."'
This Note begins with a background' of Ohio Supreme Court limita-
tions on the General Assembly's definition of injury in workers' compen-
sation law. Part IV(C) of this Note will analyze other jurisdiction's ap-
proaches to the compensability of physical injury caused by mental
stimulus and will discuss other aspects and refinements of personal in-
jury in the course of employment. It is proposed that there is a need for
reform in Ohio's construction of "any injury"'-one that will embrace
the nationwide trends of "uniformly" compensating workers for both
physical and mental injury caused by mental stimulus. Ohio currently
excludes both types of injuries." Such an exclusion of workers so in-
jured results in an arbitrary and capricious denial of equal protection
under the law, which is expressly prohibited by the Ohio Constitution."
Part IV(D) of this Note presents an equal protection argument for
employees harmed by work-related mental stimuli. A complete under-
standing of these issues, however, must begin with an understanding of
the concept of "injury."
II. THE HISTORY OF "INJURY" IN OHIO
The General Assembly has been very liberal in its statutory defini-
tions of injury. The legislative history behind the present definition
within section 4123.01(C) reflects the intent of the General Assembly to
compensate workers for injuries received in the course of, and arising
out of, their employment. Beginning with General Code section 1465-68,
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page 1981) (emphasis denotes amend-
ment).
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.95 (Page 1981). This liberal construction
statute is fitting for legislation such as workers' compensation which is remedial
in character and designed to protect workers.
' For a more in-depth review of Ohio court decisions with respect to the
definition of "injury," see Alloway, Malone Revisited-Definition of Injury
Under the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 75 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Alloway]; Note, Definition of Injury in Ohio Workers' Com-
pensation Law: Bowman v. National Graphics Corp., 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 987 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Bowman].
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page 1981).
"0 1B A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.21 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as LARSON]; see generally Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury
in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1244 n.4, 1247 (1970) (Ohio
limits recovery to injuries that are physical and traumatic) [hereinafter cited as
Mental and Nervous Injury].
" OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26.
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the legislature provided that every employee injured in the course of
employment, provided it was not purposely self-inflicted, would be en-
titled to receive compensation.12
The Ohio Supreme Court has commented on this enactment that:
Immediately upon the statute becoming effective, the courts
were confronted with the problem of determining the scope of
the term "injury" as related to employment. In the early cases
decided by this court it was determined that compensation could
be awarded only for accidental and traumatic injuries. It appears
that these elements of the definition of compensable injury came
into the cases through the effort of the courts to distinguish an
injury by accident from an injury through disease .... "
The court further concluded that prior judicial interpretation of the
statute approved compensation for only those injuries which "arose out
of the employment" and that the requisite causal connection must exist
between the worker's injury and his employment. 4
In addition, Ohio courts were called upon to determine whether
physical impact was a necessary element of accidental or traumatic in-
jury. The 1931 case of Industrial Commission v. O'Malley 5 examined the
question of whether emotional stress leading to an employee's death
constituted a compensable injury. O'Malley was a night watchman on
duty when police arrived to investigate an open door in the building
next to his place of employment. Shortly afterwards he was found in ap-
parent pain, claiming "the excitement of it all" aggravated his hyper-
tension so that he required medical attention. 6 He died shortly after ar-
rival at the hospital. The Ohio Supreme Court denied compensation based
on a finding that O'Malley's death was due to mere excitement, without
physical injury as a contributing factor.
Soon thereafter, the court was charged with a duty to define the term
"injury" as it applied to "accidents." In Industrial Commission v.
Franken,"7 the claimant was performing his usual work duties when he
began to feel ill. After going home, he suffered heart failure and died
twenty-five days later. In denying compensation, the court held that
"the term 'injury' . . . comprehends only such injuries as are accidental
in their origin and cause."18 The Franken court concluded by stating
that if its decision was contrary to the legislative intent, the General
Assembly should so state.
,2 1913 Ohio Laws 79. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
13 Malone v. Industrial Comm'n, 140 Ohio St. 292, 295, 43 N.E.2d 266, 269
(1942).
14 Id. at 295, 43 N.E.2d at 269.
15 124 Ohio St. 401, 178 N.E. 842 (1931).
Id. at 403, 178 N.E. at 843.
17 126 Ohio St. 299, 185 N.E. 199 (1933).
,S Id. at 302, 185 N.E. at 200.
19821
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In 1937, the General Assembly responded to the Franken suggestion
by amending section 1465-68 of the General Code as follows: "The term
'injury' as used in this section and in the workmen's compensation act
shall include any injury received in the course of, and arising out of the
injured employee's employment."1 9 This attempt to set forth the
broadest definition possible, contingent upon a causal relationship be-
tween injury and employment, was expanded by the supreme court in
Malone v. Industrial Commission."
The 1942 Malone decision is important for several reasons. The case
concerned a foundry worker who died from heat prostration, developed
while working in a superheated atmosphere. The court awarded com-
pensation and defined "injury" as "comprehend[ing] a physical or
traumatic damage or harm, accidental in its character in the sense of be-
ing the result of a sudden mishap occurring by chance, unexpectedly
and not in the usual course of events, at a particular time and place."'"
The court was mainly concerned with the notion of accidental injury as
encompassing not only accidental means, but also being accidental in
character and result. Further, the court defined "physical or traumatic
injury" as "one produced by any sudden violent attack upon the tissues
or organs of a living body producing a wound, tear or an abnormal condi-
tion thereon or therein. The attack may result from contact with
deleterious gases, destructive temperatures or forces of nature."" Thus,
the Malone decision confirmed a broad definition of "injury" and estab-
lished that "external accidental means" was not a requirement for "in-
11'23jury.
Ohio courts were given another opportunity to rule on the physical
consequences of employment-related mental stress in the case of
McNees v. Cincinnati Street Railway Co. 2 1' McNees, a trolley car driver,
died of coronary thrombosis brought on by severe mental strain and ex-
citement while driving at night in a dense fog. The common pleas court
19 1937 Ohio Laws 109 (emphasis added).
140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266 (1942).
21 Id. at 292, 43 N.E.2d at 267 (syllabus 1). See generally Alloway, supra note
8. The court contradicted itself by defining "injury" by these terms and then com-
pensating the dependent. The superheated atmosphere involved in Malone was
not the result of a sudden mishap occurring unexpectedly, as the employee was
faced with these conditions daily in his work at the foundry. This contradiction
was later the basis for holding that unusual circumstance need not precede a com-
pensable injury under Czarnecki v. Jones & Laughlin, 58 Ohio St. 2d 413, 390
N.E.2d 1195 (1979).
140 Ohio St. at 302, 43 N.E.2d at 271.
See Hearing v. Wylie, 173 Ohio St. 221, 223, 180 N.E.2d 921, 922 (1962);
Dripps v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Ohio St. 407, 412, 135 N.E.2d 873, 877 (1956)
(Zimmerman, J., dissenting).
24 90 Ohio App. 223, 101 N.E.2d 1 (1st Dist. 1951) (Hamilton County). See also
152 Ohio St. 269, 89 N.E.2d 138 (1949).
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entered judgment for McNees notwithstanding the verdict, that was af-
firmed by the appellate court, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed and
remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the employer on the
general verdict of the jury."5 The case was later heard by the appellate
court after a motion for new trial was overruled on remand.
On remand, the appellate court outlined both facts and case history
noting that although the general verdict was entered for the employer,
the jury had found in a special verdict that the mental strain and excite-
ment from driving conditions caused McNees' death. O'Malley was dis-
tinguished because death there resulted from mere excitement without
a mental strain and was unconnected with O'Malley's employment. In-
stead, the appellate court relied upon the supreme court's prior state-
ment that: "Since the jury's answer to the special interrogatory finds a
causal connection between decedent's death and the strain and excite-
ment of certain conditions of his employment, it necessarily establishes
a causal connection between his employment and the coronary throm-
bosis."2 In addition, the appellate court observed that other jurisdic-
tions had held that mental strain, worry and anxiety causing "sudden
and unexpected breaking of some portion of the internal structure of
the body . . . or the failure of some essential function thereof"2" were
compensable injuries. Nonetheless, the case was again reversed and
remanded, this time because the charge to the jury that "mere mental
strain or worry is not an injury within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Law" was prejudicial error. 8
A few years later, the supreme court retreated from its position on
Ohio's definition of "injury." In Toth v. Standard Oil Co.,' the court
denied compensation to an employee partially paralyzed from a cerebral
hemorrhage. The hemorrhage was brought on by mental strain over a
work-related incident. The court refused relief on the ground that "in-
jury" must be "physical or that there [must] be a traumatic damage, ac-
cidental in character."3
The Toth court distinguished Malone by defining artificial heat as a
physical contact. Also, it dismissed McNees, stressing the "unusual
physical exertion"" and stating that the court in that case was more
, 90 Ohio App. at 224-25, 101 N.E.2d at 2.
Id. at 230, 101 N.E.2d at 4 (citations omitted).
27 Id. at 231, 101 N.E.2d at 5.
UId.
'9 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953). The claimant, a truckdriver, was sub-
jected to police investigation on the suspicion that he killed a pedestrian in a hit-
skip accident. Toth suffered partial paralysis from a cerebral hemorrhage seven
days after a lie detector test caused him great anxiety and worry.
Id. at 5, 113 N.E.2d at 83.
sI Id. at 6, 113 N.E.2d at 83. The physical exertion involved in McNees v. Cin-
cinnati St. Ry. Co., 90 Ohio App. 223, 101 N.E.2d 1 (1st Dist. 1951) (Hamilton
1982]
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1982
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
concerned with reconciling the special interrogatory with the general
verdict. The court found that "the connection with his employment was
remote, but even if it had been immediate, worry and anxiety alone does
not . . . constitute an injury."32
In dissent, Justice Zimmerman reminded the court "that the
Workmen's Compensation Act, in view of its remedial character, is to be
construed liberally in favor of an injured workman."33 Once again, as in
his dissent in McNees,4 Justice Zimmerman suggested that mental
strain resulting in a physical disability "constitutes an 'injury' within
the meaning and intent of the statute."3 " Furthermore, a leading
authority on workers' compensation has criticized this "judicial limita-
tion" as the "only one contra holding [prior to Szymanski] reported in
the last quarter century" precluding compensability for mental stimulus
caused physical injury.
In 1959, the Ohio General Assembly broadened the 1937 definition of
"injury" to include "any injury, whether caused by external accidental
means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of,
and arising out of, the injured employee's employment."37 In essence,
this was merely a codification of the Malone ruling. This attempt to
assert the remedial character of workers' compensation for employees
plagued by "any injury" was bolstered further by the addition of a
liberal construction statute: "Sections 4123.01 to 4123.94, inclusive, of
the Revised Code shall be liberally construed in favor of employees and
the dependents of deceased employees."39
Two further constructions of the definition of "injury" are relevant to
the historical changes of the definition. The first, in Bowman v. National
Graphics Corp.,' provided that job-related injuries resulting from a
gradual worsening condition are not compensable, for there must be a
specific occurrence or incident which caused the injury. The second,
County), concerned an attempt to put trolley poles onto wires. The supreme
court, in the decision below, was not concerned with this physical aspect; instead,
it discussed mental strain and excitement as the cause of death. See McNees v.
Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 152 Ohio St. 269, 280, 89 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1949).
' 160 Ohio St. at 6-7, 113 N.E.2d at 84.
Id. at 7, 113 N.E.2d at 84 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting).
" 152 Ohio St. at 286, 89 N.E.2d at 147 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting).
' 160 Ohio St. at 8, 113 N.E.2d at 84 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting).
36 LARSON, supra note 10, § 42.21. The Ohio Supreme Court decision in Toth
stands out against both federal and state precedents which allow compensation
for physical injuries caused by mental stimuli. Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page 1981) (emphasis added).
Szymanski, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 197, 407 N.E.2d at 505 (1980); Hearing v.
Wylie, 173 Ohio St. 221, 180 N.E.2d 921 (1962).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.95 (Page 1981).
,0 55 Ohio St. 2d 222, 378 N.E.2d 1056 (1978); Bowman, supra note 8. In
Bowman, the court stated that the claimant's injury developed gradually and as a
result of normal "wear and tear."
[Vol. 31:145
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Czarnecki v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., concerned a worker who injured
his back while lifting a drum during the course of his employment. The
court held that injury was compensable, absent proof of unusual cir-
cumstances prior to the injury, where the injury arose from an accidental
event. Szymanski v. Halle's Department Store is a culmination of these
diverse definitions of "injury" and must be examined with them in mind.
I1. Szymanski: FACTS AND HOLDING
Alicja Szymanski was employed as a sales clerk in the cosmetics sec-
tion of Halle's Department Store. On February 7, 1976, while showing a
customer a requested item, she infringed on the product line to be sold by a
co-worker. The co-worker began to scream and shout at the claimant, verb-
ally attacking her and humiliating her in front of co-workers and
customers. Szymanski left the sales area in tears and found it necessary
to leave work early due to "pressure" and headaches.
She was treated medically for her symptoms of nervous tension, mental
depression and slightly elevated blood pressure. Upon return to work that
week, still under medication, Szymanski collapsed and was hospitalized.
Her "physician determined that she had suffered a 'changing myocardial
process consistent of an ischemia."2 As a result of her condition, [she]
was unable to return to work until April 12, 1976." 4
Szymanski's claim was disallowed by the Bureau of Workers' Compen-
sation. "The Cleveland Regional Board of Review affirmed the disallow-
ance, and the Industrial Commission refused to entertain [her] appeal.""
She then appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County,"5
which granted a motion by the employer for judgment on the pleadings."
The court of appeals reversed the lower court, holding that the complaint
alleged a compensable injury."
1 58 Ohio St. 2d 413, 390 N.E.2d 1195 (1979).
42 63 Ohio St. 2d at 195, 407 N.E.2d at 503. "The term 'ischemia' was defined
by [Szymanski's) physician las] 'a condition caused by a deficient blood supply to a
part of the heart muscle due to a functional constriction or an actual obstruction
of blood vessels.' In his letter to the claimant's attorney, the physician concluded:
"[I]t is very probable that her transient heart condition was provoked by the
unpleasant incident which endangered her life." Id.
'3 Id. at 195, 407 N.E.2d at 503.
"Id.
The appeal was taken pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.519 (Page
1980) which provides:
The claimant or the employer may appeal a decision of the industrial
commission ... in any injury or occupational disease case, other than a
decision as to the extent of disability, to the court of common pleas of
the county in which the injury was inflicted or in which the contract of
employment was made if the injury occurred outside the state.
63 Ohio St. 2d at 196, 407 N.E.2d at 504.
Szymanski v. Halle's Dept. Store, No. 39377, slip op. at 7 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th
Dist., Oct. 4, 1979) (Cuyahoga County).
1982]
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The court of appeals began its opinion with a discussion of the definition
of injury in Ohio workers' compensation law: "[ilt is firmly established that
the present legislative definition of a compensable injury is patterned
after Malone v. Industrial Commission . . . Malone held that a compen-
sable injury includes injuries accidental in character and result."" The
court then cited a retreat from the Malone decision: "external acciden-
tal means" were necessary in finding a compensable injury under
Dripps v. Industrial Commission,49 followed by and approved by Toth
where the supreme court decided "anxiety and worry allegedly causally
connected to an incident of the employment did not constitute a compen-
sable injury."5 The Malone view, however, was reviewed by the
General Assembly, and, as the court stated, was the basis of the 1959
amendment to section 4123.01(C) of the Revised Code, which supple-
mented the "Dripps Doctrine."'" In making Szymanski's claim compensa-
ble, the court reviewed four decisions wherein "the question of whether
a heart attack is a compensable injury [was] held to be one of causation
and for the jury."52 The court of appeals distinguished Toth as follows:
Toth is a pre-1959 decision rendered during the transition from
Malone to Dripps and prior to the 1959 amendment. In our view,
a heart attack caused by a verbal attack by fellow employees is
"accidental in character and result" and is then potentially a
compensable injury. The question of whether the verbal attack
did in fact cause the heart attack is an issue of causation for the
trier of fact. 3
Upon an allowance to certify the record, the employer appealed to the
Supreme Court of Ohio,' which concluded that "disabilities . . . caused
solely by emotional stress without contemporaneous physical injury or
physical trauma are not compensable injuries within the meaning of
" Id. at 3; Malone v. Industrial Comm'n, 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266
(1942).
" 165 Ohio St. 407, 135 N.E.2d 873 (1956). Toth was decided after the Dripps
decision. The appellate court found this fact significant and concluded that since
Dripps was later "overruled," Toth could also be found inconsistent with the in-
tent of the legislature in its 1959 amendment and dismissed from consideration.
I Szymanski v. Halle's Dept. Store, No. 39377, slip op. at 7 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th
Dist., Oct. 4, 1979) (Cuyahoga County).
"' Id. at 4, The "Dripps Doctrine," patterned after Dripps, 165 Ohio St. 407,
135 N.E.2d 873, comprehended injuries as "physical or traumatic in character,
that it arose suddenly and was not intentionally self-inflicted, and that it resulted
by external means from some specific event or from some specific event or
mishap occurring suddenly and unexpectedly and not in the usual course of
events." 165 Ohio St. at 409, 135 N.E.2d at 875.
Szymanski v. Halle's Dept. Store, No. 39377, slip op. at 7 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th
Dist., Oct. 4, 1979) (Cuyahoga County).
5 Id.
1 63 Ohio St. 2d at 196, 407 N.E.2d at 504.
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R.C. 4123.01(C)."" Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court had come full circle by
returning to the O'Malley definition of injury."e
IV. CRITIQUE
In denying compensation to Szymanski for her heart condition caused
by emotional stress, a majority of the Ohio Supreme Court required a
disability caused by "physical or traumatic damage or harm" as set out
in Malone.57
A. The Majority Opinion
The court began with a review of O'Malley and Toth, the two earlier
supreme court cases dealing with emotional stress and the "injury" con-
cept. The court repeated its stance that "disabilities occasioned solely
by emotional stress" are not compensable injuries.58
The court again failed to view the "injury" in its entire sequence. 9 In
O'Malley, Toth and Szymanski, the court failed to recognize emotional
stress as the origin of the physical disability. The injury in all three
cases is not the emotional stress, but the physical disability resulting
from emotional stress: the physical consequence of a mental stimulus. In
his scathing criticism of the Toth decision, Larson clearly spelled this
out:
It is odd that Ohio, with no statutory compulsion to do so (since
the statute includes any injury received in the course of and
arising out of the employment) insists on reading into the
statute a limitation to injuries that are physical or traumatic.
Even by Ohio's own terms, however, there is certainly physical
injury enough to suit anyone in a cerebral hemorrhage resulting
in partial paralysis. The injury must be understood to embrace
the total episode from start to finish."
Larson also criticized the Szymanski decision, stating that "the 'injury'
was here not hearing words, it was the heart attack."'"
Answering the appellate court's suggestion that Toth was overruled
by the 1959 amendment to section 4123.01(C) of the Revised Code,62 the
Id. at 198, 407 N.E.2d at 505.
124 Ohio St. 401, 178 N.E. 842 (1931).
5 140 Ohio St. at 292, 43 N.E.2d at 267 (syllabus 1).
" 63 Ohio St. 2d at 198, 407 N.E.2d at 505.
5 See Mental and Nervous Injury, supra note 10. Time factors involved in
receiving an injury may vary from immediate to protracted. The court should
look at this set of circumstances as a protracted culmination of prior events.
LARSON, supra note 10, § 42.21 at 7-593.
61 LARSON, supra note 10, § 42.21 at 7-589 (Supp. 1981).
62 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page 1981).
19821
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court firmly stated: "[tihere is nothing in the legislative history of this
amendment which indicates an intention by the General Assembly to
compensate for disabilities arising solely from emotional stress.6 3
The court, however, failed to review closely the phrase "accidental in
character and result."6 4 Had the Szymanski court fully comprehended
the meaning of this phrase, it would have corrected its faulty reasoning
in Malone. The Malone court's holding that "[tihe term injury .. .com-
prehends a physical or traumatic damage or harm"6 5 confused the issue
of "injury" in the same manner as O'Malley, Toth and now, Szymanski.
Had the court reviewed Szymanski's claim in light of its entire sequence
from origin to result, it would have found injury "accidental in character
and result," for although there were no physical external means causing
the "accident," there was a physical disability "accidental in character
and result." A heart condition resulting from emotional stress during
the course of, and arising out of, employment is clearly accidental within
the meaning of the statute if "injury" is perceived as a sequence of
events.
Curiously, the court cited Malone as precedent for a restrictive defini-
tion of injury. Two aspects of Malone, however, lead to a different result
than the one reached in Szymanski:
First, the Malone decision was actually a broader reading of the
definition of injury than had previously been used because it added
the "accidental in character or result" language....
Second, the court granted the compensation sought in Malone.
It is not the normal rule of case analysis to use a case that has
offered a broadened construction of a statute to stand for the
proposition that the statute should be narrowly construed.
The majority alluded briefly to Szymanski's contention "that it is a
denial of equal protection of the laws to exclude from compensation
those disabled employees whose disabilities arise solely from from non-
physical and non-traumatic incidents related to their employment."67
The court declined to pass judgment on this issue, as it was "neither
raised nor briefed in the courts below."6 6 Nonetheless, this issue is of
great importance to Ohio workers.
B. The Minority Opinion
In his vigorous dissent,69 Justice Sweeney attacked the majority's
63 Ohio St. 2d at 198, 407 N.E.2d at 505.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page 1981).
65 140 Ohio St. at 292, 43 N.E.2d at 266 (syllabus 1).
Bowman, supra note 8, at 996.
6 63 Ohio St. 2d at 198, 407 N.E.2d at 505.
6 Id.
69 Id. at 199, 407 N.E.2d at 505.
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reasoning. He stated that the court's "periodic exercise in contorting
the language of R.C. 4123.01(C)"' created a perverse outcome in this
case. For Justice Sweeney, it was "inconceivable ... how the majority
[could] derive from [a definition of the term "injury"] a requirement that
the injury must arise from physical contact or physical trauma."" He
believed that a reliance on Toth was "regrettable," for "[it should be
clear that the injury in Toth was not anxiety, but was rather the
resulting stroke; just as here the injury was the heart attack.""
The dissenting opinion presents a logical and more appropriate con-
struction of the General Assembly's language in the present definition
of injury. It also embraces the spirit of the liberal construction statute
wherein workers' compensation statutes are to be "liberally construed
in favor of employees." 3 The legislature's expansion of the statute's
coverage was designed to broaden the court's persistent restrictive con-
struction of "injury." A holding that the origin of an injury need not be
physical, so long as the result is a physical disability is clearly within
the purview of section 4123.01(C). 4
Justice Sweeney also noted that Toth has been sharply criticized as
being "distinctly out of line" with other state decisions. Courts in other
states have "uniformly" found compensability for mentally caused
physical injury." He forewarned the inequitable results caused by the
majority rule: if the co-worker had slapped Szymanski during the
assault, compensability probably would have been awarded. He also
cited an out of state court that "realized the irrationality of such a
distinction"7 " and compensated a claimant, having high blood pressure,
who suffered a cerebral hemorrhage due to unusual job pressures."
The dissent's judicious consideration of other state decisions and the
inequitable results that follow as a result of Ohio's disfavored stance
reflect a need for a change in the supreme court's reasoning. Physical
contact is an arbitrary measuring factor for determining which injuries
should be removed from the court's consideration. Other states have not
70 Id.
71 id.
72 Id.
, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.95 (Page 1981).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page 1981).
7' 63 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 407 N.E.2d at 505-06 (citing Larson's treatise); see
LARSON, supra note 10.
76 Id. at 200, 407 N.E.2d at 505-06. Justice Sweeney quoted Larson's treatise
in his dissent. Larson, the leading authority on workers' compensation law, is a
motivating force behind workers' compensation reform throughout the nation. He
has been cited in many of the major cases in mental stimulus-physical injury and
mental stimulus-mental injury awards.
7 Insurance Dept. of Miss. v. Dinsmore, 233 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d 691 (1958).
See also notes 109-11 infra and accompanying text for other out-of-state decisions.
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found physical contact to be a prerequisite to compensability, and Ohio
should adapt its present reasoning to this course of thought.
Justice Sweeney forcefully advocated a change of Ohio's interpreta-
tion:
It appears to this writer that the majority's refusal to recognize
[Szymanski's] heart attack as a compensable injury is based on a
fear that a causal relationship cannot be adequately established
between the emotional distress and the physical result. If such a
fear does exist it should be squarely confronted, rather than dis-
missed through a convoluted application of the definitional
statute.
78
He suggested two tests to determine the compensability of injuries
resulting from emotional distress: 1) a determination of whether the in-
jury was received in the course of, and arising out of, the employment 7 '
and 2) a test wherein the worker must show that his injury resulted
from "greater emotional strain or tension than that to which all workers
are occasionally subjected."'
These two tests would adequately establish the requisite causal rela-
tionship for compensability. They would insure that only those injured
in the scope of their employment from truly stressful, work-related
risks would be compensated. Moreover, workers' compensation statutes
are remedial in character and should be read in light of the 1959 liberal
construction statute. It is not consonant with the spirit of such legisla-
tion to restrict compensability to those workers who have suffered
disabilities caused only by physical or traumatic harm. Employees suf-
fering accidental disabilities due to enhanced emotional stress incurred
in the course of, and arising out of, their employment should be compen-
sated.
C. Expansion of the Concept of Injury:
Inclusion of Mental Stimuli as Compensable Injuries
This section presents discussion of the following variations of per-
sonal injury: physical trauma causing nervous injury, mental stimulus
causing physical injury and mental stimulus causing nervous injury.8
78 63 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 407 N.E.2d at 506.
79 Id.
" Id. at 201, 407 N.E.2d at 506 (Sweeney, J., dissenting) (quoting Wilson v.
Tippets-Abbott-McCarthy-Stratton, 22 A.D.2d 720, 253 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1964)).
81 The terms "mental stimulus," "nervous injury," "traumatic neurosis,"
"psychoneurosis," et. al. are "only a rough expedient adopted in order to sort out
an almost infinite variety of subtle conditions and relationships for compensation
law purposes." LARSON, supra note 10, § 42.20 at 7-784. See also Wasmuth,
Psychosomatic Disease and the Law, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 34 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as Wasmuth].
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Both Ohio case law and the Ohio Industrial Commission accept only the
first of these three categories. This limitation conflicts with other state
decisions, for "[w]hen mental or nervous injury is preceeded or followed
by physical injury, the resulting disability is almost universally compen-
sable, and the majority of jurisdictions also award compensation when a
mental stimulus produces a nervous injury." 8 2 It is recommended here
that Ohio expand its current restrictive definition of injury to reflect
the position taken by the majority of states.
1. Physical Trauma Causing Nervous Injury
"It is now uniformly held that the full disability including the effects
of the neurosis is compensable when there has been a physical accident
or trauma and the claimant's disability is increased or prolonged by
traumatic neurosis, conversion hysteria or hysterical paralysis." 3 Ohio
subscribes to this theory. Administrators and courts are willing to grant
an award for a residual disability known as "traumatic neurosis," in
which the employee suffers a work-connected physical blow or trauma
which causes a disabling mental or nervous disturbance. The ad-
ministrators and courts seem to have no trouble with these cases
because the requisite physical trauma, however slight, is present.
Of course, "[tihe compensability of disability or death resulting from
an injury occurring subsequently to a compensable injury .. .depends
upon whether the injury is of such a character that its consequences are
to be regarded as the natural result of the original injury."" Thus, the
claimant must establish the causal relationship between the injury and
the mental or neurotic condition with the required degree of certainty.
One of the earliest Ohio cases dealing with an employment-connected
mental disorder resulting from a physical injury is the 1935 American
Rolling Mill Co. v. Duncan5 decision. Duncan accidentally suffered an
82 LARSON, supra note 10, § 42.00 at 7-575.
' Mental and Nervous Injury, supra note 10, at 1249. Cf. Binder, The Defense
of Claims of Psychic Trauma and Psychiatric Disability, 12 FORUM 934, 934 (1977)
(In some jurisdictions, psychiatric disabilities identified as "traumatic neuroses"
or "functional overlays" account for "fully 15 percent of successful claims-and
their number continues to grow.") The Binder article criticizes recovery under
this area of workers' compensation law. One must keep in mind, however, that all
claimants must prove the requisite causal connection between injury and employ-
ment. Workers' compensation is a remedy for work-related injuries, not a form of
general insurance. Through evidentiary hearings, the various Industrial Commis-
sions can weed out obvious fraudulent claims.
58 0. JUR. 2d Workmens' Compensation § 114 (1963) (emphasis added); see
also 82 AM. JUR. 2d Workmen's Compensation § 301 (1976).
" 53 Ohio App. 33, 4 N.E.2d 148 (1st Dist. 1935) (Butler County). Of course,
claimant had to causally connect his meningoencephalitis with the abrasion suf-
fered at work. The claimant, via an ingenious attorney and convincing medical
evidence, did prove the causal connection by a preponderance of the evidence.
This is a good example of a court willing to award compensation for mental injury
to those showing even the slightest physical contact.
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abrasive injury and was able to prove that his meningoencephalitis (a
form of insanity) resulted from the spread of streptococci which lodged
in an abscess caused by the abrasion. His mental disability was allowed.
Similarly compensable was the injury in the 1939 case of Jones v. In-
dustrial Commission," wherein a beer truck driver received a severe
blow to the back of his head by the steel tailgate of the truck he was
repairing. Evidence was introduced as to the "marked peculiarity of his
actions," 7 both mental and physical, throughout the course of the day of
the injury. Jones disappeared that evening and was found drowned one
month later. The court accepted the jury's finding that his presumed
accidental drowning was due to an injury "which took away his power of
mental and physical coordination." 8 Since his death was traceable to a
mental condition caused by injury sustained in the course of his employ-
ment, compensation was granted.
When an accidental injury or disease arises out of and in the course of
employment and the mental derangement flowing therefrom results in
suicide, compensation will be granted.
However, since the presumption is against suicide, a claimant
seeking to recover for a death by suicide must establish that an
injury was sustained in the course of decedent's employment, that
the injury caused a derangement of the mind to such an extent that
decedent could not entertain a fixed purpose to take his own life,
and that suicide was the direct result of that lack of purpose which
characterizes an insane mind.8
Therefore, dependents of deceased workers must prove that the act of
suicide was "committed under an uncontrollable impulse or delirium or
frenzy directly and proximately produced by a compensable injury,
30 Ohio Law Abs. 7 (Ct. App., 2d Dist. 1939) (Franklin County).
Id. at 9. Claimant suffered a personality change, loss of motor and mental
control, and was obviously impaired in his normal everyday functions.
Id. at 8.
See Industrial Comm'n v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio St. 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1935);
Speece v. Industrial Comm'n, 46 Ohio Law Abs. 453, 70 N.E. 387 (Ct. App., 7th
Dist. 1945) (Belmont County).
" 58 0. JUR. 2d Workmens' Compensation § 107, at 243-44 (1963). Ohio
subscribes to the necessity of proving an uncontrollable impulse, without volition,
in committing suicide. In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915), pro-
mulgated this doctrine which is followed by many jurisdictions. Other jurisdic-
tions hold that where an injury deprives the worker of normal judgment, and this
mental disturbance incites suicidal depression, death is compensable. This is
known as the "chain of causation test." Brenne v. Department of Indus., Labor &
Human Relations, 38 Wis. 2d 84, 156 N.W.2d 497 (1968). Under this rule, a wilfull
act of suicide is still compensable if the dependents can prove a mental distur-
bance causally related to the decedent's originally-compensated injury.
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without conscious volition to produce death or knowledge of the physical
consequences of the act."9
The 1960 decision of State v. Industrial Commission92 dealt with a
claimant whose back condition and nervousness were either due to or
were aggravated by a fall sustained at work. The claimant's back
disability and "psycho neurosis" were held compensable by the Regional
Board, which further stated: "It]he claimant is entitled to compensation
for the time lost while being treated for her nervous condition." 93 The Ohio
Supreme Court agreed and compelled the Industrial Commission by man-
damus to complete the order of the Regional Board allowing the claim.
Thus, Ohio administrators and courts have unqualifiedly recognized
that mental conditions that causally result from physical injuries incurred
at work are compensable. This understanding "that the body is a whole,
and that injuries of one part may affect the entire organism"94 is fully
effectuated in this area of Ohio workers' compensation law. The need for
reform is in the area referred to hereafter as "mental stimulus causing
physical injury."
2. Mental Stimulus Causing Physical Injury
In both his treatise and article on mental and nervous injury under
workers' compensation law,95 Larson discussed uniformity of compen-
sability for physical injuries caused by mental stimuli. Of course, he
highlighted Ohio's insistence on the element of physical causation and
stressed that "[tihis is a judicial limitation.""6 In this section, other state
decisions regarding sudden and protracted physical injuries as a result
of mental stimuli will be reviewed.
A sudden event precipitating a mental stimulus, which results in im-
mediate physical injury, is probably the easiest example to analyze.
Cases involving sudden frights or accidents and near-accidents with
" 58 0. JUR. 2d Workmens' Compensation § 107, at 243 (1963); see generally
Scanlon, Suicide As Compensable Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 12
CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 26 (1963); Note, Workmen's Compensation-Suicide Compen-
sable Where Causal Connection to Injury, 31 U. CIN. L. REV. 187 (1962); Annot.,
15 A.L.R.3d 616 (1967).
92 83 Ohio Law Abs. 114, 165 N.E.2d 211 (Ct. App., 10th Dist. 1960) (Franklin
County). At this time, the administrative agency did not bother to question the
validity of collecting compensation for a nervous disorder related to a physical-
stimulus disability. This is further proof that Ohio is willing to award compensa-
tion once a physical element can be maintained. However, the reverse (mental
stimulus-physical injury) cannot be compensated under Szymanski.
" Id. at 116, 165 N.E.2d at 212.
9 Wasmuth, supra note 81, at 35.
9 LARSON, supra note 10, § 42.21 at 7-585-586; Mental and Nervous Injury,
supra note 10, at 1243.
" LARSON, supra note 10, § 42.21 at 7-589; Mental and Nervous Injury, supra
note 10, at 1244.
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direct physical consequences abound. For example, Charon's Case," a
1947 Massachusetts decision, dealt with a claimant paralyzed on one
side of her body as a result of sheer fright, experienced when lightning
damaged three motors, causing a loud noise and a startling flash of light
near her work station. The Massachusetts court recognized that these
external circumstances triggered a mental reaction resulting in physical
injury. The claimant was compensated.
"The case is no less clear when the extreme fright or emotional
disturbance, instead of being momentary, is somewhat protracted.""8
Ohio common pleas courts have compensated two claimants for such pro-
tracted injuries. In the 1940 case of Johnson v. Industrial Commission,"
an employee was severely reprimanded and subjected to "constant and
violent shouting and nagging" by her foreman. As a result of this verbal
abuse, she "became hysterical and numb and had to be removed to her
home in an ambulance where she remained for a period of approximately
four weeks suffering from intense hysteria and hysterical paralysis."'o
The Common Pleas Court of Hamilton County awarded compensation
pursuant to its finding that she suffered a "physical injury as a result of a
sudden happening, to wit, the abuse to which she was subjected by the
foreman at the particular time." '
In 1951, the Common Pleas Court of Butler County decided Day v.
Industrial Commission"0 2 which concerned a union stewardess involved
in a heated discussion at a grievance committee meeting. The claimant
was placed "under a very high nervous tension" and collapsed "less than
an hour after the meeting was concluded and after complaining of pains
in her head." "' She died from a cerebral hemorrhage and heart failure
with "antecedent causes due to hypertension and myocarditis."' 04 The
court held that the statutory term "any injury" included mental strain
and that since claimant's death was accidental in character and result,"5
in the course of employment, and proximately caused by incidents
related to such work, her dependent should be entitled to share in the
workers' compensation fund. Two years later the Ohio court of appeals
" 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511 (1947).
98 LARSON, supra note 10, § 42.21 at 7-589-590.
" 16 Ohio Op. 438, 30 Ohio Law Abs. 632 (C.P. 1940) (Hamilton County).
'0 Id. at 439, 30 Ohio Law Abs. at 632.
"'1 Id. The court based its decision on a "sudden happening," albeit the verbal
abuse she was subjected to was "constant," due to the supreme court's insistence
on a specific event, resulting in an injury. Goodman v. Industrial Comm'n, 135
Ohio St. 81, 19 N.E.2d 508 (1939).
' 65 Ohio Law Abs. 5 (C.P. 1951) (Butler County).
Id. at 7.
104 Id.
The court cited Malone v. Industrial Comm'n, 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d
266 (1942), for Malone's earlier precedent focusing on "accidental."
[Vol. 31:145
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss1/9
WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORM
decision in McNees allowed compensation for mental strain resulting in
the death of a trolly car driver. 10
Thus, these earlier lower court decisions are in harmony with other
state supreme court decisions acknowledging the relationship between
mental strain and its physical consequences. These other state decisions
concerning mental stimulus-physical injury have understood that:
The effects are the result of the press of circumstances and
environment upon the emotions, midbrain and autonomic ner-
vous system. The effects of stress might be from an injury [or]
from mental strain ... of any cause .... Stress, in the medical
sense, therefore, is any stimulus or succession of stimuli of such
magnitude as to tend to disrupt the homeostasis of the organism.
When the mechanisms of adjustment fail or become dispropor-
tionate or incoordinate, the stress may be considered an injury,
resulting in disease, disability or death."7
Examples of out-of-state decisions concerning mental stress and
strain with resultant physical injury include two 1958 decisions. In Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Hart,' the Texas Supreme Court held that the
precipitating cause of a stroke was an emotional stimulus due to brow-
beating by an irate customer. Compensation was awarded to the hyper-
tensive claimant. The Mississippi Supreme Court reached the same con-
clusion in Insurance Department of Mississippi v. Dinsmore,0 9 wherein
an employee with preexisting hypertension collapsed at work as a result
of an aggravation of her condition due to unusual mental and emotional
strain. Both cases relied heavily on the expert testimony of medical doc-
tors in order to establish the requisite causal relationship."' Just as
Justice Sweeney had noted in his Szymanski dissent,"' the Dinsmore
court stated:
It seems unthinkable that, if hypertension may be aggravated
either by physical or mental and emotional exertion, courts
should be willing to accept the physical as causative, but reject,
as not accidental, a disability, proximately resulting from mental
and emotional exertion."2
"' See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
107 Wasmuth, supra note 81, at 40-41.
01 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
233 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d 691 (1958).
"' Medical testimony is often necessary to establish the technical rationale for
bodily malfunction. It is also utilized to determine the requisite proximate cause
relationship between an accident and the injury. White Motor Corp. v. Moore, 48
Ohio St. 2d 156, 357 N.E.2d 1069 (1976). See generally Note, Heart Injuries Under
Workers' Compensation: Medical and Legal Considerations, 14 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 1365 (1980).
"1 63 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 407 N.E.2d at 506.
". 233 Miss. at 579, 102 So. 2d at 694.
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The 1972 Louisiana Supreme Court case of Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 3
wherein an employee suffered a stroke while arguing over his paycheck,
forcefully summed up the arguments in favor of compensating workers
for physical injuries caused by mental stimuli:
Is there a valid distinction between injuries which occur in the
course of some physical exertion, however slight, and injuries
which occur because of emotional shock, fright, or stress? The vio-
lence to the physical structure of the body is the same. The sud-
den and unexpected nature of the occurrence is the same. The
catastrophic effect upon the workman is the same."'
Larson noted similarly that: "The character of the case does not
change in kind, but only in degree when the stimulus takes the form of
sustained anxiety or pressure leading to a heart attack or cerebral
hemorrhage." 115 Probably the best example of gradual emotional upset
is Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc. "' Klimas suffered a fatal
heart attack attributed solely to work-related mental disturbance and
emotional strain caused by fear of losing his job and missing a deadline
for a project experiencing cost over-runs. Compensation was awarded in
this landmark decision since "undue anxiety, strain and mental stress
from work are frequently more devastating than a mere physical
injury." 7
There are several tests employed in measuring mental stimulus-
physical injury cases. They have been devised to satisfy the "accidental"
requirement encompassed by "injury" and are utilized to compensate
only those workers who can prove that their injury was truly a result of
work pressure. The most common is the "unusualness in emotional
strain" test."8 Courts generally do not have a problem with the single
event cases wherein an identifiable event immediately results in
physical injury."9 There is, however, more concern with the protracted
and gradual case, since administrative agencies and courts want to be
certain that the employment truly contributed to the mental stimulus
resulting in physical injury. Here, circumstances will be examined closely
to determine whether there was an "unusual exertion" on the part of
the employee. Of course, this test has its drawbacks, "because of the dif-
ficulty and confusion attendant [to] the search for the benchmark of
,' 270 So. 2d 867 (La. Sup. Ct. 1972).
... Id. at 870.
15 LARSON, supra note 10, § 42.21 at 7-590.
116 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961).
"7 Id. at 213, 176 N.E.2d at 716, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 16. See also Brush, Heart In-
juries: When Are They Compensable, 53 N.Y. ST. B.J. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Brush].
"1 LARSON, supra note 10, § 38.65.
"1 Id. at 7-199-200.
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'usual' exertion against which to measure the precipitating exertion." "
Another test utilized in mental stimulus-physical injury cases is the
"exertion greater than the ordinary wear and tear of life" test."' Cases
using this test generally involve overwork, protracted negotiations,
special deadlines and "nervous strain" that is "so conspicuous that they
can be seen to be quantitatively greater than any standard of
'usualness' that might be selected, whether the employee's own past ex-
perience, the experience of employee's generally or the wear and tear of
everyday nonemployment life."12
New York courts introduced a third test dealing specially with
on-the-job altercations. In Wilson v. Tippetts-Abbott-McCarthy-Strat-
ton,"' a 1964 supreme court case, a worker suffered a stroke as a result
of an argument with his superior. He was compensated for proving
"greater emotional strain or tension than that to which all workers are
occasionally subjected.""' This case was cited by Justice Sweeney in his
Szymanski dissent 2 ' as presenting the standard for determining
whether a heart attack or cerebral hemorrhage should be compensated.
This test would enable the court to compensate employees like Ms.
Szymanski for the "accidental" quality of their injury, as required by
statutory law.'
The above cases and tests represent only a few of the myriad deci-
sions supporting a finding of compensability for workers physically
disabled by work-induced mental stress and strain. In their decisions
the courts have embraced the beneficent, remedial character of
workers' compensation laws. Ohio courts should review these decisions
and change their stance accordingly.
3. Mental Stimulus Causing Nervous Injury
A current trend in workers' compensation law involves a "nervous"
or psychological disability caused by a single mental stimulus or by
mental stimuli occurring in a relatively short period of time. "[T]here is
already visible a distinct majority position supporting compensation in
these cases."" 7 A number of cases, however, support the contrary view
and reason either that "such disorders could not be said to have been
caused by 'accident' . . . [or] could not properly be considered an 'injury'
1'2 Id. at 7-220-221.
121 Brush, supra note 117, at 55-56.
122 LARSON, supra note 10, § 38.65 at 7-221.
123 22 A.D.2d 720, 253 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1964).
124 Id. at 721, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 150. See also Santacroce v. 40 W. 20th St., Inc.,
10 N.Y.2d 855, 178 N.E.2d 912, 222 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1961).
125 63 Ohio St. 2d at 201, 407 N.E.2d at 506 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(0) (Page 1981).
12 LARSON, supra note 10, § 42.23 at 7-624.
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within the meaning of compensation statutes.28 Although there is
growing authority approving compensability in protracted stress situa-
tions, most cases in this category concern a mental disorder occasioned
by an identifiable sudden mental stimulus."
The 1975 New York decision of Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co."s
is one example of a single traumatic event triggering a nervous injury.
The claimant was a secretary who, over a period of time, assumed
varied responsibilities of her superior, due to his anxiety and depres-
sion. One morning, after calling the police at his direction, she entered
his office immediately after his suicide. The claimant subsequently suf-
fered from acute depressive reaction which disabled her for several
months. The court held that "nervous injury precipitated by psychic
trauma is compensable to the same extent as physical injury."1 The
court reasoned that because stress of shock may result in either a
physical or psychological injury, there should be no distinction between
the two, since the individual is incapable of proper functioning in either
circumstance. Also, the court noted that "[tihere is nothing talismanic
about physical impact";" 2 consequently, recovery should not be limited
to mental stimulus-physical injury cases.
Illinois is another jurisdiction allowing compensation. In 1976, the
Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Commission33 decision awarded compensa-
tion to an employee who had ordered a co-worker to operate a punch press
which severed the co-worker's hand up to the wrist. Claimant extricated
" Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 161, 167 (1980). This annotation is an interesting and
thorough review of other state decisions concerning mental stimulus-mental in-jury cases. Arguments for and against compensation are discussed at length. It is
proposed in this Note that Ohio courts favor an award of compensation for
workers sustaining a mental injury due to mental stimulus. See generally Note,
When Stress Becomes Distress: Disabilities Under Workers' Compensation in
Massachusetts, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 287 (1980).
12 This Note will not review mental disorders which allegedly arise from an
unconscious desire to prolong compensation (commonly referred to as "compensa-
tion neurosis"). See LARSON, supra note 10, § 42.24; and Mental and Nervous In-
jury, supra note 10, for a discussion of "compensation neurosis."
130 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975). See also a few of the
myriad law review articles concerning this case: Comment, Workmen's Compen-
sation- Compensability of Mental Injury-In re Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr
Co., 21 N.Y.L.F. 465 (1976); Comment, Workmen's Compensation-New York
Court of Appeals Holds That Mental Injury Precipitated by Psychic Trauma is
Compensable, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 204 (1975); Comment, Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay
& Curr Co.: Workmen's Compensation for Mental Injury-New York Attempts
to Join the Majority, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 1007 (1975); Note, Workmen's Compen-
sation: Compensability of Psychological Disability Precipitated by Psychological
Trauma, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1128 (1975).
131 36 N.Y.2d at 510, 330 N.E.2d at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
1 Id. at 510, 330 N.E.2d at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
13 62 Ill. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913 (1976).
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the hand from the machine and promptly fainted. She suffered a severe
psychological reaction which disabled her. The court concluded that an
employee who "suffers a sudden, severe emotional shock traceable to a
definite time, place and cause which causes psychological injury or harm
has suffered an accident,""13 even though the worker suffered no physical
trauma or injury. The court also concluded there is little justification for a
rule allowing compensation for workers suffering from psychological
disabilities caused by minor physical injuries while withholding compen-
sation from those with similar psychological disabilities caused by sud-
den, severe emotional shock.
Only recently have courts been willing to compensate victims of the
protracted stress of anxiety-producing work situations. The fountain-
head of this doctrine, Carter v. General Motors Corp.,'35 held that a men-
tal disorder precipitated solely by the emotional pressures of the daily
performance of work is compensable. This viewpoint has slowly at-
tracted a following, and it is now the majority position in jurisdictions
which have dealt with the question of whether gradual mental stimulus
causing nervous injury should be compensated. 3 '
Of course, the causal nexus between work and injury and the test of
whether the injury resulted "from a situation of greater dimensions
than the day-to-day mental stress and tensions which all employees
must experience""' must be established. The claimant in Swiss Colony,
Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations,' a 1976
Wisconsin case, was able to prove that her mental breakdown was a
result of job-related stresses and strains greater than that which
employees are generally subjected and that these stresses and strains
caused her nervous injury. The court awarded compensation for mental
disability arising from the "nerve-wracking" nature of claimant's job,
which consisted of an unusually heavy work load, long hours and a
critical and berating supervisor.
Thus, courts have dealt with the entire realm of "injury" cases and
found compensability in nearly every circumstance, be it physical causa-
tion with mental result or a mental causation with mental result. These
courts have understood that injury is "the effect of the total episode
from first to last on the total organism, including brain and nervous
1 Id. at 563, 343 N.E.2d at 917.
361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1961).
138 LARSON, supra note 10, § 42.23(b).
"' Id. at 7-639. This test is designed to award compensation to those workers
who can prove a greater than ordinary risk inherent in their work, in order to
distinguish their injury from that risk the public is exposed to in general. This is
based on the rationale that workers' compensation is designed to compensate
workers for employment-related risks and is not a form of general insurance.
" 72 Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976).
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system." "' Causal nexus and "unusualness" or "greater emotional strain
than everyday life" tests enable the courts to confine recovery to those
workers truly deserving an award of compensation. The reluctance of
Ohio courts to follow suit should be amended. Workers injured as a
result of mental stimuli should be entitled to an award of compensation
for their disabilities.
D. Equal Protection and Due Process of Law Considerations
Failure to compensate an injury caused by mental stimuli with physical
or mental consequences may be attacked on equal protection grounds. 4'
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution proclaims
that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.' Further, the Ohio Constitution, in article I, sec-
tion 2, proclaims that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the people.
Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit .... " ,42
By creating a statutory scheme to provide "compensation to workmen
and their dependents, for death, injury or occupational disease, occasioned
in the course of such workmen's employment," 4' the General Assembly
has not violated' the equal protection guarantee. However, Ohio courts
have reached inequitable results by discriminatorily applying the "in-
jury" provision.' Arguably, workers disabled by mental stimuli are
similarly situated to workers disabled by physical stimuli.'45 Disabling
bodily malfunctions, whatever their cause, are within the General
Assembly's requirement of "any injury." A worker suffering from an in-
jury via mental stimuli is harmed to the same extent as one suffering
" Mental and Nervous Injury, supra note 10, at 1255.
The major point of this Note is that Ohio courts should follow the numerous
other state courts which have found such injuries compensable. A second and less
detailed argument centers on equal protection and due process issues. These
issues were first raised before the Ohio Supreme Court in Szymanski's brief and
in the Amicus Curiae brief. Because it was not argued below, the alleged denial
of equal protection under the law was not considered by the Ohio Supreme Court.
See Szymanski, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 198, 407 N.E.2d at 505.
"'. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
1"2 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2.
'4 OHIO CONST. art II, § 35.
'4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page 1981).
"' Other state courts have held that an individual incapable of functioning
properly due to psychic trauma is as deserving of an award as an individual who
has suffered a physical impact injury. The resulting harm to the worker is the
same whether caused by physical or mental stimuli. A worker who suffers a heart
attack or cerebral thrombosis as a result of psychic trauma is as incapacitated as a
worker who suffers a heart attack or cerebral thrombosis from physical exertion.
Insurance Dept. of Miss. v. Dinsmore, 233 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d 691 (1958). See
Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d
637 (1975) (similar argument with regard to mental causation-mental result in-
juries).
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from an injury via physical stimuli. Szymanski's heart condition, albeit
caused by emotionally upsetting circumstances, proved just as disabling
as any compensable heart condition resulting from a physical source.
Yet, the Ohio Supreme Court automatically excludes all disabled work-
ers suffering mentally-induced injuries. This uniform exclusion of a class
of workers injured without "compensable physical injury or physical
trauma"146 results in an arbitrary and capricious denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws, which is expressly prohibited by article II, section 26 of
the Ohio Constitution,147 which guarantees uniform operation of general
laws.
A cardinal precept of federal and state law is that all stand equal
before the law.'48 This maxim indicates that all persons have an absolute
equality of right and opportunity and that they must be afforded the
equal protection of laws. Therefore, all laws, to be valid, must "operate
equally upon all persons of the same class." '49
The Ohio General Assembly has the broad power of classification and
differentiation of persons and subject matter in legislative enactments.'
The Ohio legislature has the inherent right and power of classification
of all persons in its purview'' because equal protection guarantees that
similarly situated persons will be dealt with in a similar manner and
that those in different circumstances will not be treated as if they were
the same.5 2 The classifications, however, must have a "real and substan-
tial basis" and "shall not be arbitrary and unreasonable."'53 Moreover,
'4 Szymanski, 63 Ohio St. 2d at 198, 407 N.E.2d at 505 (emphasis added).
OHIO CONST. art II, § 26 provides, in part: "All laws of a general nature,
shall have a uniform operation throughout the state ...." This section of the Ohio
Constitution has been cited with reference to "equal protection" requirements in
many workers' compensation claims, including: Sechler v. Krouse, 56 Ohio St. 2d
185, 383 N.E.2d 572 (1978); Fleischman v. Flowers, 25 Ohio St. 2d 131, 267 N.E.2d
318 (1971); State ex rel. Lourin v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Ohio St. 618, 37 N.E.2d
595 (1941).
... For purposes of this Note, the Ohio Constitution will be referred to in this
equal protection argument. However, "[tihe equal protection of the law provision
in article I of the Ohio Constitution is substantially the same as the guaranty in
that respect contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion." 17 0. JUR. 3d Constitutional Law § 626 at 148 (1980). Therefore, equal pro-
tection clauses which place limitations upon governmental action are essentially
identical in the federal and Ohio Constitutions and only the Ohio Constitution
need be cited. See Porter v. Oberlin, 1 Ohio St. 2d 143, 205 N.E.2d 363 (1965).
"' 17 0. JUR. 3d Constitutional Law § 628 at 150 (1980).
"5 State ex rel. Lourin v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Ohio St. 618, 37 N.E.2d 595
(1941); Winrod v. Sommer, 36 Ohio Misc. 37, 302 N.E.2d 597 (C.P. 1972) (Carroll
County).
"' State v. Fields, 27 Ohio Law Abs. 662, 665, 35 N.E.2d 744, 748 (Ct. App., 2d
Dist. 1938) (Darke County).
" Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341, 345 (1949).
"1 17 0. JuR. 3d Constitutional Law § 630 (1980).
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"[tihe reasonableness of a statutory classification is dependent upon the
purpose of the Act."1 4
Courts have recognized that even workers' compensation laws, if ar-
bitrary and unreasonable, could violate the Ohio Constitution which pro-
vides that "[ajll laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation
throughout the state." "' In Fleischman v. Flowers,"'6 the claimant suffered
an injury to her left hand resulting in permanent residual disability that
limited motion in the hand. Her application for a determination of the
percentage of permanent partial disability under the terms of section
4123.57"57 was denied by the administrative agency and lower courts
because the claimant did not meet three prerequisites to compensability 58
The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged earlier court decisions which
held that the power of the General Assembly "while broad, is not
limitless."' The court determined that the provision of section 4123.57
limiting eligibility to file an application led to arbitrary and capricious
results and was therefore "unconstitutional as being in conflict with the
'equal protection' requirements of Section 26 of Article II of the Ohio
Constitution." 160
In general, the workers' compensation laws of Ohio, as enacted in the
state Constitution and statutes, do not violate individual protections af-
.5 Kinney v. Kaiser, 41 Ohio St. 2d 120, 123, 322 N.E.2d 884, 886 (1975). The
purpose of Ohio's workers' compensation act is to provide compensation to
workers for injuries occasioned in the course of their employment. OHIO CONST.
art. II, § 35. This purpose reflects the General Assembly's intent to shift the risk
of loss of earning capacity from the worker to the employer and, ultimately, to
the consumer. In light of this beneficial and remedial character, the workers'
compensation law should be construed liberally in favor of the employee. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.95 (Page 1981).
1 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 26.
15 25 Ohio St. 2d 131, 267 N.E.2d 318 (1971).
157 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.57 (Page 1981) replaces the earlier, unconstitu-
tional version.
"5 The three prerequisites limited eligibility to file an application for a deter-
mination of the percentage of permanent partial disability to those "persons who
(1) have received compensation for temporary total disability; or (2) would have
been eligible for compensation for temporary total disability had the employer
not paid such person wages during the period of disability; or (3) have received
compensation for partial disability based on impairment in earning capacity."
Fleischman v. Flowers, 25 Ohio St. 2d 131, 133, 267 N.E.2d 318, 320 (1971). The
eligibility requirements applied regardless of the extent of the worker's perma-
nent partial disability resulting from a compensable injury.
159 25 Ohio St. 2d at 135, 267 N.E.2d at 321.
16 Id. at 139, 267 N.E.2d at 323. The eligibility requirements led to inequitable
results. They precluded a worker from returning to work within seven days from
having their application considered, "although the extent or degree of his perma-
nent partial disability may be far in excess of that suffered by another employee
who happened to be totally absent from employment for more than one week,
and even though there be no question as to the relationship of the disability to
the injury." Id. at 137, 267 N.E.2d at 322.
[Vol. 31:145
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss1/9
WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORM
forded by the United States Constitution.' The General Assembly has
classified workers' compensation laws in a manner that does not violate
the equal protection guarantees of the Ohio Constitution since they apply
to "every person in the service of any person, firm, or private corpora-
tion, including any public service corporation."'62 This classification
scheme appears perfect because it treats all similarly situated persons
in a similar manner; that is, if workers are injured due to their employ-
ment, they should be compensated. The legislature is under a constitu-
tional mandate to pass laws "providing compensation to workmen and
their dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease, occasioned
in the course of such workmen's employment. l"' Accordingly, the
General Assembly has liberally defined "injury" as "any injury, whether
caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and
result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured
employee's employment."'64 Further, the legislature enacted a liberal
construction statute favoring employees and dependents of deceased
employees.'65
Thus, the legislature has certainly done its part in providing an equal
opportunity for all workers to be compensated for disabilities caused by
their employment. The problem, however, lies at the administrative and
court levels, where the statutes are implemented. The problem in Ohio
with respect to workers injured by mental stimuli is not one of imper-
missible classification but one of impermissible application unfairly
denying equal protection to workers injured by mental stimuli. Ohio
government officials, in their administrative and judicial capacities,
have applied the term "any injury" to different groups of workers with
varying degrees of disabilities; hence, "any injury" connotes only one
statutory term. However, administrative and judicial application has
dichotomized the term into two groups: those with physical causation in-
juries and those with non-physical causation injuries. Workers in the
first subclassification, physical causation injuries, are compensated for
all results naturally flowing from the original physical trauma or
injury,"' while workers in the second subclassification, non-physical
causation injuries, are denied compensation even though they suffer
substantially similar physical or mental disabilities.'
161 Allen v. Eastman Kodak Co., 50 Ohio App. 2d 216, 362 N.E.2d 665 (10th
Dist. 1976) (Franklin County).
162 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(A)(2) (Page 1981).
' OHIO CONST. art. II, § 35.
164 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page 1981) (emphasis added).
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.95 (Page 1981).
' See notes 83-94 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of physical in-
jury and residual disability, i.e., "traumatic neurosis."
,67 See, e.g., Szymanski v. Halle's Dept. Store, 63 Ohio St. 2d 195, 407 N.E.2d
502 (1980).
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Equal protection guarantees of the Ohio Constitution should be con-
sidered when the court distinguishes between those who may and those
who may not receive a benefit from the workers' compensation system.
The issue is whether the distinction between those who may and those
who may not receive compensation is a legitimate one. In its quest to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner, the court must
first determine whether persons being treated differently are in fact
"dissimilar."
Medical evidence has demonstrated that mental stimuli may produce
symptoms and disabilities similar to those resulting from sudden,
strenuous physical effort."6 8 Other states have accepted medical
evidence relating the similar disabling results obtained by mental
stimuli when a physical injury occurs.' A growing number of other
states have found mental stimuli-mental result disabilities similar in
harmful effect to physical injuries, and award compensation accordingly
for harmful change in the human organism.' The human organism, in
order to function capably, must not suffer harm to either its external
and internal physical elements, or to its mental balance."' Thus, in some
jurisdictions outside Ohio, medical experts and court authorities agree
18 With regard to heart attacks, acute emotional disturbances have been
shown both experimentally and by common clinical observation to be capable, in
the same manner as sudden strenuous physical effort, of inducing sudden changes
in cardiovascular dynamics that could lead to heart attacks. Acute psychological
stimuli may result in increased cardiac outputs, augmented stroke volumes, in-
creased heart rates, enhanced myocardial oxygen consumption and blood re-
quirements, increased demands for coronary arterial flow, elevations of blood
pressure, cardiac rhythm irregularities and abnormal electrocardiographic
changes. E. SAGALL & B. REED, THE HEART AND THE LAW 618 (1968). See also
Note, Heart Injuries Under Workers' Compensation: Medical and Legal Con-
siderations, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1365 (1980). With regard to mental disorders,
see ALLEN, FERSTER & RUBIN, READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY (1975) for a
review of traumatic neurosis, psychosomatic injuries and other disorders and
their relation to the law. After a review of these articles, physical causation alone
becomes a suspect criterion when non-physical causation injuries can also be
shown to proximately cause an "injury" under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C)
(Page 1981).
189 See notes 113-15 supra and accompanying text.
1 0 See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
171 Larson has observed the following:
As to the category of mental stimulus causing nervous injury, with no
'physical' involvement, although the cases are sharply divided, the
strength of the trend toward coverage suggests that the time is perhaps
not too far off when compensation law generally will cease to set an
artificial and medically unjustifiable gulf between 'physical' and 'ner-
vous.' The test of existence of injury can then be greatly simplified.The
single question will be whether there was a harmful change in the
human organism-not just its bones and muscles, but its brain and
nerves as well.
Mental and Nervous Injury, supra note 10, at 1260.
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that mental stimuli is similar in effect to physical stimuli causing injury.
Ohio's insistence on blindly ignoring these findings is undefensible. In
effect, the dichotomy produced by the Ohio Supreme Court has created
a classification impermissible under equal protection guarantees. This
classification undermines the purpose of workers' compensation: to pro-
vide a remedy to injured employees. The arbitrary classification
established by administrative and court action affects only a certain
number of persons, i.e., those with physical causation injuries, who fit
the purposes of the statute, but excludes others who are similarly
situated. Therefore, access to the remedy of workers' compensation is
not equal for all individuals injured in the course of their employment.
Due process, as well as equal protection, guarantees must be upheld
by Ohio's legislature and judiciary. In Kinney v. Kaiser,'2 where section
4123.59 death benefits were denied, the court concluded that the statute
was unconstitutional because its jurisdictional prerequisites'73 violated
equal protection and due process. The court stated that equal protection
of the laws requires "reasonable grounds for making a distinction be-
tween those within and those outside a designated class" so that the
test for reasonableness of a classification "is dependent upon the pur-
pose of the Act." '1 The court opined further that the jurisdictional
prerequisites subclassified dependents of deceased workers into those
who could meet one or more of the prerequisites and those who could
not. Dependents who could not meet one or more prerequisites were auto-
matically precluded from consideration for death benefits. However, the
court noted: "If given an opportunity to present evidence, it is certain
that some members of the excluded group could prove a causal connec-
tion between an industrial injury and the subsequent death of the
workman." 75
The Kinney court also stated that the classifications established by
the jurisdictional prerequisites obstructed compensation objectives of
both article II, section 35 of the Ohio Constitution and statutory section
4123.59; yet "could be upheld if it were shown that they were rationally
related to the accomplishment of some state objective at least as impor-
'.z 41 Ohio St. 2d 120, 322 N.E.2d 880 (1975).
' The three separate and alternative jurisdictional prerequisites for consider-
ing a death claim were:
(1) the death must have occurred within three years of the injury; or (2)
the workman must have received total or partial disability compensation
for the injury during any portion of the year preceding death; or (3) the
Administrator must find that the workman applied for total or partial
disability compensation, was examined by a licensed physician and
would have been entitled to compensation had he not died.
41 Ohio St. 2d at 121-22, 322 N.E.2d at 882.
Id. at 123, 322 N.E.2d at 883.
'75 Id.
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tant as the objective of compensating dependents . .. '" of workers who,
as a result of their employment, met their deaths. The Kinney court
found that the sole function of the prerequisite was "administrative
ease" in rejecting claims filed by dependents of workers whose deaths
were not causally related to their employment.177 This effectively
established a "conclusive presumption" that no causal nexus existed
between work and death if the dependents could not satisfy the jurisdic-
tional prerequisites, thereby relieving the administrative agency of its
duty to conduct evidentiary hearings on causation.' Such conclusive
presumptions erected for "administrative ease" were struck down as
violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by the
United States Supreme Court in Vandis v. Kline.' The Kinney court
followed this precedent.
In finding that equal protection guarantees were also violated, the Kin-
ney court recommended that the administrative agency use evidentiary
hearings for disputed claims for death benefits, placing the burden of
proving the causal nexus upon the claimant. This would be the only
"reasonable and practicable" method which would not automatically
"eliminate a whole class of claims without considering the merits of
each." "'
As the Kinney decision illustrates, the present dichotomy, of physical
and non-physical causation injuries created by administrative and
judicial decisions, is an arbitrary and capricious denial of equal protec-
tion and due process rights of claimants suffering non-physical causation
injuries. The purpose and main objective of both article II, section 35 of
the Ohio Constitution and Revised Code section 4123.01(C) is to compen-
sate workers for injuries arising out of and in the course of their employ-
ment. The General Assembly has not specified that the injury must be
occasioned by physical means, yet the judiciary has limited compensa-
tion to such. The Ohio Supreme Court itself has declared: "[iut is fun-
damental that the state courts will not apply a valid statute as to work
such discrimination and inequality as would invalidate the statute if
those vices were contained in it,"'' but it continues to discriminate
nonetheless against non-physically caused injuries.
17' Id. at 124, 322 N.E.2d at 883.
177 Id.
178 Id.
'7 412 U.S. 441 (1973). With regard to conclusive presumptions instituted for
"administrative ease," the Court proclaimed: "The State's interest in ad-
ministrative ease and certainty cannot, in and of itself, save the conclusive
presumption from invalidity under the Due Process Clause where there are other
reasonable and practicable means of establishing the pertinent facts on which the
State's objective is premised ...." Id. at 451. This objective may be obtained
through evidentiary hearings at the administrative level.
180 41 Ohio St. 2d at 125, 322 N.E.2d at 884.
' Maynard v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 144 Ohio St. 22, 28, 56 N.E.2d 195, 198 (1944).
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Given an opportunity to present evidence, heart attack, cerebral
thrombosis or even mental injury, claimants could prove a causal con-
nection between their work environment and their disability."' If a
claimant's injury is not preceded by a physical trauma, he will be denied
opportunity to present evidence in his favor under the Szymanski deci-
sion. This automatic denial is based on "administrative ease" and a "fear
that a causal relationship cannot be adequately established between the
emotional distress and the physical"' 8 or mental result. Such an
automatic rejection is akin to the Kinney conclusive presumption of a
lack of causal nexus between work and injury if the claimant cannot
establish physical causation. Such a conclusive presumption is inconsis-
tent with the spirit of statutes designed to compensate workers for
work-related injuries, and is an arbitrary and capricious denial of the
constitutional right to equal protection and due process of law.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the policy considerations of the Ohio Supreme Court were
unstated, it is safe to assume that the Szymanski court's decision was
based in part on a desire to curtail the increase in the cost of compen-
sating a larger class of injured employees and in part on a desire to
reduce the likelihood of fraudulent claims. 84 This judicial limitation,
however, is not supported by the General Assembly's intent to compen-
sate workers injured in the course of their employment. Such a limita-
tion by the court narrows the scope of recoverable injuries and yields
inequitable results. Thus, workers suffering from work-related injuries
have found that the court will render a different decision regarding an
award of compensation, contingent upon the injury's cause: physical or
mental.
Based on a review of prior Ohio court decisions, of legislative enact-
ments designed to broaden the scope of recoverable injuries, of other state
decisions and of an equal protection and due process analysis, it is recom-
mended here that the Ohio Supreme Court adopt the spirit of workers'
compensation legislation and discard the restrictive bonds prescribed
by Szymanski. Moreover, Ohio Revised Code section 4123.01(C) should
be interpreted liberally so workers can receive compensation for mental
causation-physical result or mental causation-mental result injuries
received in the course of, and arising out of, their employment.
ELLEN L. KNIGHT
This case is also authority for the "accidental in character and result" portion of
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(C) (Page 1981).
182 See note 168 supra and accompanying text.
" 63 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 407 N.E.2d at 506 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
18 For a succinct, yet detailed summary of policy considerations, the discus-
sion in Bowman, supra note 8, at 1002-06, is analogous.
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